How does the CJEU relate to its external interlocutors; litigants, the legal community and governments? These projects argue that the CJEU actively seeks alliance partners beyond governments. They also explore how the Court pursues its own interests without running against member states’ wishes.
Courting litigants: relationship with civil society
- “Leveling and Spotlighting: How International Courts Refract Private Litigation to Build Institutional Legitimacy” with Tommaso Pavone and Louisa Boulaziz forthcoming in British Journal of Political Science
Private actors are increasingly turning to international courts (ICs). We argue that ICs can refract private litigation to build legitimacy and mitigate intergovernmental backlash. By leveling the odds for individuals and spotlighting their claims over those of more resourceful litigants, ICs cultivate civil society support and legitimate judicial policymaking in intergovernmental polities where individuals are disempowered. We evaluate this argument by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). We trace how ECJ judges privilege individuals in their advocacy and assess if they match words with deeds. Leveraging an original dataset, we find that the ECJ “levels”, supporting individual claims over businesses boasting larger and more experienced legal teams. The ECJ also “spotlights” its support for individuals through press releases that get amplified in law reviews. Our findings challenge the view that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the ``haves’’ come out ahead in litigation.
A draft of the paper can be found here.
- Courtroom capital: Who lawyers know or what they know? with Tommaso Pavone and Louisa Boulaziz presented at EUSA 2025 (Philadelphia)
Research consistently demonstrates that experienced lawyers achieve better outcomes in court. However, it remains unclear whether knowledge of court procedures or lawyers’ familiarity with the judges drives these results. We argue that a lawyer’s “courtroom capital” is primarily rooted in their familiarity with specific judges. Given the significance of knowing the judges, we also anticipate that lawyers are more likely to win in court when they argue cases orally in court, in front of judges they are acquainted with.
We investigate our claims in the context of the General Court of the European Union, where lawyers may encounter different judges and not all cases have oral hearings. We find that it is familiarity with the reporting judge, and not familiarity with court procedures, that increases lawyers win rates. Our results also reveal that lawyers familiarity with judges only pays off in cases with oral hearings.
Published work
- “EU Law Litigation: Who Litigates, Who Influences Judges, What Downstream Effects?" (2025) with Tommaso Pavone. In Empirical Legal Studies of EU Law. D. Naurin, U. Sadl, & J. Zglinski (Eds.). United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
The Court’s relationship with governments
- Judicious judging: The effects of political division on decision making in the European Court of Justice with Urska Sadl presented at APSA 2022 (Montréal)
How do courts react to political debate? Their legitimacy hinges on their ability to uphold the law impervious to political pressure. The authority of the ruling follows from the court’s reputation as apolitical. Politicization – understood as salient questions that divide stakeholders – threatens to erode this image. It imposes conflicting demands: Courts can prove their worth by solving questions for which there is a demand for a legal solution, but they risk their reputation in a politically divided environment.
Literature on judicial independence focuses on direct and explicit threats issued by the political branch. Arguments of legislative override typically predict that political division empowers the judiciary. In contrast, we argue that courts are sensitive even to the potential eruption of conflict because they value their diffuse legitimacy. Effective judicial policy making is thus a question of strategic timing.
To test our theory, we study the European Court of Justice. Known as the “dark horse of integration”, it is an independent court with political sway. Yet political considerations profoundly affects its decision making. We draw on unprecedented data mapping out the legal ambit of all preliminary cases relating to the Free movement of people throughout the history. We find that the Court holds back on the legal ambit of rulings, preferring to bolster its institutional authority, in times of political division. Reversely, it broadens the ambit when salience is high and conflict low. Thus, when salience and division combine, they null each other out; leaving traces only in the decision-making process.
Published work
- Sadl, Urska, Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen (2024) “The European Court of Justice, an able and unwilling lawmaker: evidence from 920 free movement of persons judgments” Revisiting Judicial Politics in the European Union. Mark Dawson, Elise Muir and Bruno deWitte (Eds.). Edward Elgar Publishing. Chapter 14. pp. 282-304.
