Decision makers in the European Parliament (EP)

The European Parliament in Strasbourg

Political parties obtain influence through their choice of representatives. Outside of parliament, they gain sway through the candidates for whom they secure election. Inside parliament party groups shape policies through the allocation of tasks to competent members. This project delves into the mutual influence of parliamentary group allocations and the choices made by extra-parliamentary party organizations. In the center are members of Parliament whose political careers are shaped by both actors. In the center are members of Parliament whose political careers are shaped by both actors.

Election seeking

National parties do not have institutionalized presence in the EP. They enter into an outcome-based contract similar to voters. MEPs are either rewarded by reselection or kicked out of office. Report allocations dissipate uncertainty about MEPs’ ability. They thus improve MEPs’ career prospects to the extent that parties need new information about agent quality, and to the extent that parliamentary groups can provide it.

Ongoing work

  • “How Do Legislated Gender Quotas Impact Representation?” Working paper.

How does biased political recruitment – and the subsequent legislation of quotas – affect the quality of women’s performance as representatives in Parliament? I draw on insights from the literature on political agency to distinguish between the effects of selection and sanction. First, if recruitment in the absence of quotas implies higher requirements for women, then selected women are of higher quality. Second, when quotas lower the bar, new women enter office. However, parties are less certain about the quality of these women and react by increasing accountability.

I investigate representation in the European Parliament (1999-2014) before and after the legislation of quotas in several member states. Absent quotas, I find that biased selection leads to female representatives who pursue longer careers and perform better at equal levels of effort. When quotas are legislated, parties emphasize women’s service records during reselection. Women are thus incentivized to put in more effort.

A draft version can be found here.

A popularized presentation (in Norwegian) can be found here.

Published work

Legislative behavior

The European Parliament (EP) is a committee-oriented legislature; meaning that the bulk of legislative work is done in committees.

Parliamentary groups face a trade-off between the need for expertise and the risk of agency drift. We argue that groups allocate reports to maximize the value added by the rapporteur while limiting the drift. They prefer loyal policy experts to generalists and – up to a point – experienced MEPs to newcomers. Groups also balance individual demands with the collective need.

Published work

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Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen
Assistant Professor

Silje’s research concerns democratic representation in courts and parliaments. She also teaches various courses in research methods and comparative politics.