Shaping the Bench: The Effect of Ideology and Influence on Judicial Reappointments

Abstract

Courts’ institutional design has significant implications for judicial independence and accountability, particularly when terms are renewable. Policy-seeking selectors often consider judges’ past service to predict their future policy impact. However, the same judicial record may carry more or less weight in the assessment, depending on the court’s case-management process. Drawing on original data on reappointments to the Court of Justice of the European Union, we show that reappointments are made based on both ideology and impact. Transparent, selective allocation of influential positions in the court favors the retention of high-impact judges, while non-selective allocations do not. Secret voting -- conventionally seen as safeguarding judicial independence -- also does not shield judges against ideological deselection. Our analysis unveils new insights into when judicial accountability incentivizes effort. It also challenges the prevailing belief that renewable terms decrease judicial independence, instead suggesting that selectors partially rely on evaluations by court members for reappointment decisions.

Reference

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder and Daniel Naurin (2025) “Shaping the Bench: The Effect of Ideology and Influence on Judicial Reappointments” Journal of Politics, X (x), pp 1-35.