How do our representatives behave given how we select them? And how does information about their behavior affect who we retain in office?
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
The CJEU is probably the world’s most influential international court, functioning in many respects as a federal supreme court.
Yet little research exists on how judges enter the Court and how its internal organization affects decision making
Judicial behavior: the Court’s decision makers
Judges are selected by national governments for their economic left-right leanings and their influence and effort in office. Here, I trace the influence and preferences of individual judges to court outcomes and governments' selection criteria when judges are recruited.
Court strategies: the Court’s relations with external actors
No court controls the implementation of its own rulings. To ensure its position, the CJEU engages with external actors: It strategically engages with governments, but also cultivates support in civil society. Here, I probe the Court's strategic interactions with its political interlocutors.
Decision makers in the European Parliament (EP)
Political parties obtain influence through their choice of representatives. Outside of parliament, they gain sway through the candidates for whom they secure election. Inside parliament party groups shape policies through the allocation of tasks to competent members. This project delves into the mutual influence of parliamentary group allocations and the choices made by extra-parliamentary party organizations. In the center are members of Parliament whose political careers are shaped by both actors.